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Abstract
We analyze a nonlinear discrete-time Cournot duopoly game, where
players have heterogeneous expectations. Two types of players are
considered: boundedly rational and naive expectations. In this study
we show that the dynamics of the duopoly game with players whose
beliefs are heterogeneous, may become complicated. The model gives
more complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a consequence
of increasing the speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player.
The equilibrium points and local stability of the duopoly game are
investigated. As some parameters of the model are varied, the sta-
bility of the Nash equilibrium point is lost and the complex (periodic
or chaotic) behavior occurs. Numerical simulations is presented to
show that players with heterogeneous beliefs make the duopoly game
behaves chaotically. Also we get the fractal dimension of the chaotic
attractor of our map which is equivalent to the dimension of Henon
map.
Keywords: Discrete dynamical systems; Cournot duopoly games;
Complex dynamics; Heterogeneous expectations
1 Introduction
An oligopoly is a market system which is controlled by a few number of
firms producing homogeneous products. The dynamic of oligopoly game is
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more complex because oligopolist must consider not only the behaviors of
the consumers, but also the reactions of the other competitors. Cournot, in
1838 [1] introduced the first formal theory of oligopoly, who treated the case
with naive expectations, so that in every step each player assumes the last
values taken by the competitors without estimation of their future reactions.
Recently several works have shown that the Cournot model may lead to
complex behaviors such as cyclic and chaotic, see for example [2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7]. Among the first to do this was Puu [3, 4] who found a variety complex
dynamics arising in the Cournot duopoly case including the appearance of
attractors with fractal dimension. Others study of the dynamics of oligopoly
models with more firms and other modifications include Ahmed and Agiza [8],
Agiza [5] and Agiza et al. [9] such efforts have been extended by Bischi and
Kopel [10] in a duopoly game with adaptive expectations. The development
of complex oligopoly dynamics theory have been reviewed in [11].
Expectations play a key role in modelling economics phenomena. A pro-
ducer can choose his expectations rules of many available techniques to adjust
his production outputs. May be in the market of duopoly model each firm
behaves with different expectations strategies, so we are going to apply this
kind of expectations in our model which is common in reality.
In this paper we consider a duopoly model which is introduced in [7] but
each player form a different strategy in order to compute his expected out-
put. We take firm 1 represent a boundedly rational player while firm 2 has
naive expectations. Each player adjusts his outputs towards the profit max-
imizing amount as target and use his expectations rule. Recently examples
of oligopoly games with homogenous expectations are studied by Puu [4],
Kopel [6], Agiza [12], Agiza et al [13, 14]. It was shown that the dynamics of
Cournot oligopoly game may never settle to a steady state, and in the long
run they exhibit bounded dynamic which may be periodic or chaotic. Eco-
nomic model with heterogeneous players is introduced see [15,16]. Also the
dynamics of heterogeneous two-dimensional cobweb model have been studied
by Onozaki et al, see [17].
The main aim of this work is to investigate the dynamic behaviors of a
heterogenous model representing two firms using heterogeneous expectations
rules. This mechanism was applied in cobweb model [17] and gave us a guide
to apply it in our study.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the evolution of
dynamical systems of players with heterogeneous expectations rules. In sec-
tion 3, the dynamics of a duopoly game with boundedly rational player and
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naive player is modelled by a two dimensional map .The existence and local
stability of the equilibrium points of the nonlinear map are analyzed. Com-
plex dynamics of behavior occur under some changes of control parameters
of the model which are shown by numerical experiments. Fractal dimension
of the strange attractor of the map is measured numerically.
2 Heterogeneous expectations
In oligopoly game players choose simple expectations such as naive or com-
plex as rational expectations. The players can use the same strategy (ho-
mogenous expectations) or use different strategies (heterogeneous expecta-
tions). Several economic models represent the dynamics of heterogeneous
firms, have been proposed in recent years see for example [17, 18]. In this
study we consider duopoly game where each player has different strategy to
maximize his profit.
Firms can use rational expectations if they assume perfect knowledge of
underlying market and this may not be available in real economic market.
Also it is well known that in a duopoly model with a heterogeneous firms
their outputs depend upon expectations of all competitors. Hence rational
expectations can only be achieved under unrealistic assumptions. For this
reason firms try to use another and my more realistic method which is called
bounded rationality. Firms usually do not have a complete knowledge of
the market, hence they try to use partial information based on the local
estimates of the marginal profit. At each time period t each firm increases
(decreases) its production qi at the period (t + 1) if the marginal profit is
positive (negative). If the players use this kind of adjustments then they are
boundedly rational players.
Let us consider a Cournot duopoly game where qi denotes the quantity
supplied by firm i, i = 1, 2. In addition let P (qi + qj), i 6= j, denote a
twice differentiable and nonincreasing inverse demand function and let Ci(qi)
denote the twice differentiable increasing cost function. Hence the profit of
firm i is given by
Πi = P (qi + qj)qi − Ci(qi) (1)
At each time period every player must form an expectation of the rival’s
output in the next time period in order to determine the corresponding profit-
maximizing quantities for period t + 1. If we denote by qi(t) the output of
firm i at time period t, then its production qi(t + 1), i = 1, 2 for the period
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t+ 1 is decided by solving the two optimization problems.
{
q1(t+ 1) = argmaxq1 Π1(q1(t), q
e
2(t+ 1))
q2(t + 1) = argmaxq2 Π2(q
e
1(t+ 1), q2(t)),
(2)
where the function Πi(., .) denotes the profit of the i the firm and q
e
j (t + 1)
represents the expectation of firm i about the production decision of firm
j, (j = 1, 2, j 6= i). Cournot [1] assumed that qei (t + 1) = qi(t) , firm i
expects that the production of firm j will remain the same as in current
period ( naive expectations). The solution of the optimization problem of
producer i can be expressed as q1(t+ 1) = f (q2(t)),and q2(t + 1) = g(q1(t)),
so that the time evolution of the duopoly system is obtained by the iteration
of the two-dimensional map T : R2 → R2 given by
T :
{
q′1 = f(q2)
q′2 = g(q1)
(3)
where′ represents the one-period advancement operator.
The map (3) describes the duopoly game in the case of homogenous ex-
pectations (naive). The fixed points of the map (3) are located at the in-
tersections of the two reaction functions q1 = f(q2) and q2 = f(q1) and are
called Cournot-Nash equilibria of the two-players game.
Firms try to use more complex expectations such as bounded rationality,
hence they try to use local information based on the marginal profit ∂Πi
∂qi
.
At each time period t each firm increases (decreases) its production qi at the
period (t + 1) if the marginal profit is positive (negative). If the players use
this kind of adjustments then they are boundedly rational players and the
dynamical equation of this game has the form
qi(t + 1) = qi(t) + αiqi(t)
∂Πi
∂qi(t)
, t = 0, 1, 2, .. (4)
where αi is a positive parameter which represents the speed of adjustment.
The dynamics of the game (4) was studied by Bischi and Naimzada [7 ].
In duopoly game with players use a different expectations for example
the first player is boundedly rational player and the other is naive. Hence
the duopoly game in this case are composed from the first equation of (4)
and the second equation of (3). Thus the discrete dynamical system in this
case is described by:
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{
q1(t + 1) = q1(t) + α1q1(t)
∂Π1
∂q1(t)
q2(t+ 1) = g(q1(t))
(5)
Therefore Eq. (5) describes the dynamics of a duopoly game with two
players using heterogenous expectations. In the next section we are going
to apply this technique to a duopoly model with linear demand and cost
functions.
3 The model
Let qi(t), i = 1, 2 represents the output of ith supplier during period t, with a
production cost function Ci(qi). The price prevailing in period t is determined
by the total supply Q(t) = q1(t) + q2(t) through a linear demand function
P = f(Q) = a− bQ (6)
where a and b positive constants of demand function. The cost function
is taken in the linear form
Ci(qi) = ciqi, i = 1, 2 (7)
where ci is the marginal cost of ith firm. With these assumptions the
single profit of ith firm is given by
Πi = qi(a− bQ)− ciqi, i = 1, 2 (8)
Then the marginal profit of ith firm at the point (q1, q2) of the strategy
space is given by
∂Πi
∂qi
= a− ci − 2bqi − bqj , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (9)
This optimization problem has unique solution in the form
qi = ri(qj) =
1
2b
(a− ci − bqj) (10)
If the two firms are naive players, then the duopoly game is describe from
Eq.(3) by using Eq. (10) which has a linear form and the Nash equilibrium is
asymptotically stable [6]. In this study we consider two players with different
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expectation, which the first is boundedly rationality player and the other
naive player. The dynamic equation of the first player (boundedly rational
player) is obtained from inserting (9) in (3) which has the form:
q1(t + 1) = q1(t) + αq1(t)(a− c1 − 2bq1(t)− bq2(t)) (11)
Using second equation of Eq. (3) the second player (naive) updates his
output according to the dynamic equation:
q2(t + 1) =
1
2b
(a− c2 − bq1(t)) (12)
Then the duopoly game with heterogeneous players is described by a
two-dimensional nonlinear map
T (q1, q2)→ (q
′
1, q
′
2)
which is defined from coupling the dynamic equations (11) and (12) as
follows:
T :
{
q′1 = q1 + αq1(a− c1 − 2bq1 − bq2)
q′2 =
1
2b
(a− c2 − bq1)
(13)
The map (13) is a noninvertable map of the plane. The study of the
dynamical properties of the map (13) allows us to have information on the
long-run behavior of heterogenous players. Starting from given initial condi-
tion (q10,q20), the iteration of equation (13) uniquely determines a trajectory
of the states of firms output.
(q1(t), q2(t)) = T
t(q10,q20), t = 0, 1, 2, ...
3.1 Equilibrium points and local stability
The fixed points of the map (13) are obtained as nonnegative solutions of
the algebraic system
q1(a− c1 − 2bq1 − bq2) = 0
(a− c2 − 2bq2 − bq1) = 0
which is obtained by setting q′i = qi, i = 1, 2 in Eq. (13). We can have at
most two fixed points E0 = (0,
a−c2
2b
) and E∗ = (q
∗
1, q
∗
2). The fixed point E0 is
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called a boundary equilibrium [7] and have economic meaning when c2 < a.
The second equilibrium E∗ is called Nash equilibrium where
q∗1 =
a + c2 − 2c1
3b
and q∗2 =
a + c1 − 2c2
3b
(14)
provided that {
2c1 − c2 < a
2c2 − c1 < a
(15)
It is easy to verify that the equilibrium point E∗ is located at the in-
tersection of the two reaction curves which represent the locus of points of
vanishing marginal profit in Eq. (9). In the following, we assume that Eq.
(15) is satisfied, so the Nash equilibrium E∗ exists.
The study of the local stability of equilibrium solutions is based on the
localization, on the complex plane of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
of the two dimensional map (Eq. (13)).
The study of the local stability of equilibrium solutions is based on the
localization, on the complex plane of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
of the two dimensional map (Eq. (13)).
The Jacobian matrix of the map (13) at the state (q1, q2) has the from:
J(q1, q2) =
[
1 + α(a− 4bq1 − bq2 − c1) −αbq1
−1
2
0
]
(16)
The determinant of the matrix J is
Det = −
1
2
αbq1
Hence the map (13) is dissipative dynamical system when |αbq1| < 2.
Lemma 1: The fixed point E0 of the map (Eq. (13)) is unstable .
Proof: In order to prove this results, we estimate the eigenvalues of
Jacobian matrixJ at E0. The Jacobian matrix has the form
J(E0) =
[
1 + α
2
(a− 2c1 + c2) 0
−1
2
0
]
The matrix J(E0) has two eigenvalues λ1 = 1+
α
2
(a−2c1+c2) and λ2 = 0.
From condition (15), it follows that |λ1| > 1. Then E0 is unstable fixed point
(saddle point) for the map (13) and this completes the proof
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3.1.1 Local stability of Nash equilibrium
We study the local stability of Nash equilibrium of two-dimensional map
(13). The Jacobian matrix (16) at E∗, which take the form
J(E∗) =
[
1− 2αbq∗1 −αbq
∗
1
−1
2
0
]
(17)
The characteristic equations of J(E∗) is P (λ) = λ
2−Trλ+Det = 0 where
Tr is the trace and Det is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix defines in
(17), Tr = 1− 2αbq∗1 and Det = −
1
2
αbq∗1 ,
Since (Tr)2−4Det = (1−2αbq∗1)
2+2αbq∗1. It is clear that (Tr)
2−4Det > 0
( has positive discriminant), then we deduce that the eigenvalues of Nash
equilibrium are real. The local stability of Nash equilibrium is given by
using Jury’s conditions [21] which are:
1. |Det| < 1
2. 1− Tr +Det > 0, and
3. 1 + Tr +Det > 0
The first condition is |αbq∗1| < 2, which implies that
α <
6
(a− 2c1 + c2)
(18)
The second condition 1−Tr+Det = 3
2
αbq∗1 > 0, then the second condition
is satisfied. Then the third condition becomes:
5
2
αbq∗1 − 2 < 0
This inequality is equivalent to
α <
12
5(a− 2c1 + c2)
(19)
Form (18) and (19) it follows that the Nash equilibrium is stable if α <
12
5(a−2c1+c2)
and hence the following lemma is proved.
Lemma 2: The Nash equilibrium E∗ of the map (Eq. (13)) is stable
provided that α < 12
5(a−2c1+c2)
.
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From the previous lemma, we obtain information of the effects of the
model parameters on the local stability of Nash equilibrium pointE∗. For
example, an increase of the speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player
with the other parameters held fixed, has a destabilizing effect. In fact, an
increase of α, starting from a set of parameters which ensures the local sta-
bility of the Nash equilibrium, can bring out the region of the stability of
Nash equilibrium point, crossing the flip bifurcation surface α = 12
5(a−2c1+c2)
.
Similar argument apply if the parameters α, b, c1 and c2 are fixed parame-
ters and the parameter a, which represents the maximum price of the good
produced, is increased. In this case the region of stability of E∗ becomes
small, and this implies that E∗ losses its stability. Complex behaviors such
as period doubling and chaotic attractors are generated where the maximum
Lyapunov exponents of the map (16) become positives.
3.2 Numerical investigations
The main purpose of this section is to show that the qualitative behavior. of
the solutions of the duopoly game (13 ) with heterogeneous player generates
a complex behavior that the case of duopoly game with homogenous (naive)
player.
To provide some numerical evidence for the chaotic behavior of system
(13), we present various numerical results here to show the chaoticity, in-
cluding its bifurcations diagrams, strange attractors, Laypunov exponents,
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and fractal structure. In order to
study the local stability properties of the equilibrium points, it is convenient
to take the parameters values as follows: a = 10, b = .5, c1 = 3 and c2 = 5.
The Figure 1 shows the bifurcation diagram with respect to the param-
eter α (speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player), while the other
parameters are fixed ( a = 10, b = .5, c1 = 3, and c2 = 5). In fact a bifur-
cation diagram of a two-dimensional map (13) shows attractor of the model
(13) as a multi-valued of two-dimensional map of one parameter. In Figure
1 the bifurcation scenario is occurred, if α is small then three exists a stable
equilibrium point (Nash). As one can see the Nash equilibrium point (6, 2) is
locally stable for small values of α. As α increases, the Nash equilibrium be-
comes unstable, infinitely many period doubling bifurcations of the quantity
behavior becomes chaotic, as α increased. It means for a large values of speed
of adjustment of bounded rational player α, the system converge always to
complex dynamics. Also one can see that the period doubling bifurcation
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occur at α = 4
15
. If the case of α > 4
15
, one observes flip bifurcation occurs
and complex dynamic behavior begin to appear for 4
15
< α < 1.
A bifurcation diagram with respect to the marginal cost of the first player
c1, while other parameters are fixed as follow a = 10, b = .5, c2 = 5 and
α = .335, is shown in Figure 2.
We show the graph of a strange attractor for the parameter constella-
tion (a, b, c1, c2, α) = (10, .5, 3, 5, .42) in Figure 3, which exhibits a fractal
structure similar to Henon attractor [22].
In order to analyze the parameter sets for which aperiodic behavior oc-
curs, one can compute the maximal Lyapunov exponent depend on α. For
example, if the maximal Lyapunov exponent is positive, one has evidence
for chaos. Moreover, by comparing the standard bifurcation diagram in α,
one obtains a better understanding of the particular properties of the sys-
tem. In order to study the relations between the local stability of the Nash
equilibrium point and the speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player
α, one can compute the maximal Lyapunov exponents for adjustment factor
in the environment of 1. Figure 4 displays the related maximal Lyapunov
exponents as a function of α. From Figure 4, one can easily determine the
degree of the local stability for different values of α ∈ ( 4
15
, 1). At value of
α > 4
15
the maximal Lyapunov exponents is positive. A positive value of
maximal Lyapunov exponents implies sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tion for chaotic behavior. From the maximal Lyapunov exponents diagram
it is easy to determine the parameter-sets for which the system converges to
cycles, aperiodic, chaotic behavior. Beyond that its even possible to differen-
tiate between cycles of very higher order and aperiodic behavior of the map
(13) see Figure 4.
3.2.1 Sensitive dependence on initial conditions
To demonstrate the sensitivity to initial conditions of system (13), we com-
pute two orbits with initial points (q10 , q20) and (q10+.0001, q20), respectively.
The results are show in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. At the beginning the time series
are indistinguishable; but after a number of iterations, the difference between
them builds up rapidly.
Figure 5 and figure 6 show sensitive dependence on initial conditions,
q1-coordinates of the two orbits, for system (13), plotted against the time
with the parameter constellation (a, b, c1, c2, α) = (10, .5, 3, 5, .4); the q1-
coordinates of initial conditions differ by 0.0001, the other coordinate kept
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equal.
3.2.2 Fractal dimension of the map (13)
Strange attractors are typically characterized by fractal dimensions. We
examine the important characteristic of neighboring chaotic orbits to see
how rapidly they separate each other. The Lyapunov dimension see [23] is
defined as follows:
dL = j +
∑i=j
i=1 λi
|λj |
with λ1, λ2, ...., λn, where j is the largest integer such that
∑i=j
i=1 λi ≥ 0
and
∑i=j+1
i=1 λi < 0.
In our case of the two dimensional map has the Lyapunov dimension
which is given by
dL = 1 +
λ1
|λ2|
, λ1 > 0 > λ2
By the definition of the Lyapunov dimension and with help of the com-
puter simulation one can show that the Lyapunov dimension of the strange at-
tractor of system (13). At the parameters values (a, b, c1, c2, α) = (10, .5, 3, 5, .41)
two Lyapunov exponents exists and are λ1 = 0.28 and λ2 = −1.06. Therefore
the map (13) has a fractal dimension dL ≈ 1+
0.28
1.06
≈ 1.26, which is the same
fractal dimension of Henon map [24].
4 Conclusions
We have investigated the dynamics of a nonlinear, two-dimensional duopoly
game, which contains two-types of heterogeneous players: boundedly ratio-
nal player and naive player. This game is described by a two-dimensional
noninvertible map. The stability of equilibria, bifurcation and chaotic behav-
ior are analyzed. The influence of the main parameters (such as the speed
of adjustment of boundedly rational player, the maximum price of demand
function and the marginal costs of players) on the local stability is studied.
We deduced that introducing heterogeneous expectations for players in the
duopoly game cause a market structure to behave chaotically.
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Figure Captions
Fig.1. Shows the bifurcation diagram with respect to the pa-
rameter α speed of adjustment of bounded rational player, with
other fixed parameters a = 10, b = .5, c1 = 3, and c2 = 5.
Fig.2. A bifurcation diagram with respect to the marginal
cost of the first player c1, with other parameters fixed at a =
10, b = .5, c2 = 5 and α = .335
Fig.3. We show the graph of a strange attractor for the pa-
rameter constellation (a, b, c1, c2, α) = (10, .5, 3, 5, .41).
Fig.4. displays the related maximal Lyapunov exponents as
a function of α.
Fig.5. and Fig 6 show sensitive dependence on initial con-
ditions, q1-coordinates of the two orbits, for system (12), at the
parameter values (a, b, c1, c2, α) = (10, .5, 3, 5, .4);
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